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Chapter 18: 
French Professional Football: How Much Different? 
 
Wladimir Andreff 
 
France, in common with other leading European football nations, was affected by two 
significant economic shocks in the 1990s. One is the globalisation of the labour market for 
football players which occurred after the Bosman case in 1995; the other is a substantial 
change in the format and financial endowment of the UEFA club competitions, accelerated by 
the failed attempt by Media-Partners in 1999 to create a European Super-League. How has 
French professional football adjusted to this double shock since 2000? Did French football 
adjust better or worse than the other major European leagues to the changing financial 
realities of professional football at the highest level?  
Many French sports analysts are inclined to cite the French Ligue 1 (FL1) as the best managed 
football league in Europe. It is suggested that the French exception copes better than others 
with football‟s financial pressures. This exception has been praised as a virtuous example for 
other European major football leagues such as the English Premier League (EPL), Italian 
Lega Calcio (ILC), Spanish Liga de Futbol (SLF) and German Bundesliga (GBL). Some 
French official reports had gone as far as to recommend making a rule out of this exception by 
extending it to all leagues under UEFA‟s jurisdiction (Collin, 2004; Denis, 2003). Another 
report more modestly questions the pre-conditions for French football clubs to become both 
more competitive on the pitch, and economically sound (Besson, 2008). The claimed 
advantages of the French model may have been influential in informing the thinking 
underlying  the UEFA financial fair play rules 
The French model, however, is not universally admired throughout Europe, especially in the 
countries with the most powerful football leagues. There are at least three criticisms. First, it 
is argued that relatively weak sporting performance at the European level is the price paid for 
sound financial management. An extreme variant of this argument, often voiced abroad, is 
that the French football authorities focus on sound finance to the detriment of sporting 
performance. Second, smaller deficits and debts may be more an index of the French clubs‟ 
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lack of competitiveness than an example of exemplary management. Third, in some countries 
(for example, the UK, Ireland, and the Czech Republic), the French football league and 
economy are considered to be too heavily regulated, to the detriment of both competitiveness 
and the level of sporting performance.  
Rather than dismiss out-of-hand such views as belonging to the realm of caricature, this 
chapter considers whether they contain any grain of truth, and searches for a balanced 
response. Section 1 begins with an assessment of French football sporting and financial 
performance. Section 2 examines the inputs mobilised for attaining such performance, in 
order to evaluate in Section 3 the efficiency of professional football clubs in France. Against 
the background of a typically optimistic financial self-assessment on the part of French 
football clubs, Section 4 examines the sources and structure of professional football finance, 
as well as the role of the league‟s auditing body. Section 5 presents a more personal analysis, 
stressing the football clubs‟ soft budget constraint and a vicious circle between the increasing 
commercial value of TV broadcasting rights, and skyrocketing club payrolls. Section 6 
concludes by drawing some brief conclusions about the future of French professional football.   
 
1. A trade-off between financial and sporting performance? 
 
Sporting outcomes contrast sharply with financial achievements in French football: in a 
nutshell, the level of sporting achievement is lower in FL1 than in the other major European 
football leagues, while financial performance is better on average. A convenient yardstick for 
evaluating sporting performance is available in the form of achievement records in European 
and international football. A more subjective assessment can be made by evaluating the 
sporting quality of domestic games supplied by Ligue 1.  
The performance of French clubs in UEFA club competition is not impressive. From the 
inception of the restructured Champions League in 1995-96 (formerly the European Cup) 
until 2011-12, the share of French clubs in the total number of match wins is 1.5%, compared 
to 12.4% for German clubs, 16.1% for Italian clubs, 19.0% for English clubs, and 19.0% for 
Spanish clubs. At the time of writing in 2013, no French club had won a UEFA competition 
since Paris St Germain won the Cup Winners‟ Cup in 1996. Between 2000 and 2012 French 
clubs reached the quarter-finals of UEFA competitions on 13 occasions, as against 24 for ILC 
clubs, 25 for GBL clubs, 41 for EPL clubs, and 47 for SLF clubs (Table 1). In UEFA rankings 
based on club performance, France‟s ranking dropped from 4th to 5th in 2009 (below Spain, 
Italy, England and Germany), and to 6
th
 in 2012 (having been overtaken by Portugal). In 2012 
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the highest-ranked French club was Olympique Lyonnais in 10
th
 place. Olympique de 
Marseille were the 2
nd
 highest ranked, in 15
th
 place, followed by Girondins de Bordeaux in 
34
th
 place, Paris Saint Germain in 48
th
 place, and Lille OSC in 59
th
 place  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Turning to the French national team, which is not under the professional league‟s (LFP: Ligue 
de Football Professionnel) supervision, but instead accountable to the French Football 
Federation (FFF: Fédération Française de Football), performance peaked in 1998 with 
victory in the FIFA World Cup. At that stage France rose to 2
nd
 place in the FIFA world 
rankings, behind Brazil. Since then, the French national team was eliminated twice at the 
round robin (group) stage of the 2002 and 2010 World Cup final tournaments. France reached 
the 2006 World Cup final, but was defeated by Italy. Subsequently there has been a 
pronounced downward trend in the national team‟s performance. In July 2012 France was 
ranked 14
th
 in the FIFA world rankings, lagging behind countries such as Croatia, Greece and 
Russia. As regards the French national team‟s participation in UEFA‟s European 
Championships, the peak was a win in 2000, when the team appears to have benefited from 
the springboard effect of its 1998 World Cup triumph. Subsequently France reached the 
European Championships quarter-finals in 2004 and 2012, but failed to make any impact in 
this competition in 2008.  
Perhaps one of the most favourable aspects of FL1 relates to the level of competitive balance. 
At first glance this sounds paradoxical, since Olympique de Marseille won the championship 
four times in succession between 1989 and 1992, and Olympique Lyonnais on seven times in 
succession from 2002 to 2008. However, the number of different clubs that achieved top five 
placings in FL1 between 1994 and 2012 was 17. This compares favourably with 13 clubs in 
ILF and 14 in EPL, and is matched by 17 in both GBL and SLC, suggesting that competition 
is no less balanced in top-flight French football than in the other major European football 
leagues. Considering the most widely used measure of competitive balance over one season, 
the Noll-Scully index, which refers to the observed win percentage distribution relative to the 
distribution that would be expected theoretically if all teams were perfectly balanced, FL1 
was the most balanced European major league over the period 1996 to 2012 on average 
(Table 2A), and was the most balanced in each of the four years from 2005 to 2008, when 
Olympique Lyonnais dominated the championship. Between 2009 and 2012 competitive 
balance deteriorated slightly in comparison with the previous decade, in line with an overall 
trend across all of the major European leagues, with the exception of ILC.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
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With regard to long-term competitive balance – measured by the Spearman rank correlation 
between one year‟s final ranking and the previous year‟s ranking in the championship – FL1 
performs even better. FL1 was the most balanced league in seven years out of sixteen between 
1997 and 2012. Remarkably, the rank correlation for the 1999-2000 and 2000-01 seasons was 
zero, suggesting that the rankings for the former season have no predictive content for the 
latter (Table 2B). According to the standard theory of team sports leagues, FL1 offers the 
most balanced competition among the major European football leagues, with the lowest rank 
correlation on average. However, this conclusion is somewhat paradoxical for the French 
league
1
 because, if competitive balance were attractive to spectators, FL1 should have 
attracted more fans into the stadiums than any of the other major European leagues. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Figure 1, however, shows the opposite. Even though the average number of spectators 
attracted into FL1 stadiums increased from below 15,000 in 1995 to over 20,000 in 2010, FL1 
still lags behind the rest with an average 20,089 attendance per game in 2009-10. The 
corresponding 2010 figure for GBL was 42,500, EPL 34,151, ILF 28,286 and SLC 24,957. It 
appears that a high level of competitive balance is insufficient to guarantee a high quality 
sporting spectacle, contrary to the presumed association between competitive balance 
2
 and 
spectator interest. Furthermore, average ticket prices were lower in FL1 – €19 in 2009 – than 
in EPL (€49), ILF (€39), GBL (€ 28) and SLC (€ 21). One explanation, which has been cited 
increasingly in the empirical literature, is that football fans attend games in the hope of seeing 
their favourite team win, rather than in the hope of witnessing a closely balanced contest 
(Buraimo and Simmons, 2008). In France, it has been suggested that football fandom is only 
loosely linked to regular stadium attendance.  
As suggested above, the presumed advantages of a high level of competitive balance in 
domestic competition are not reflected in performance or achievement in European or 
international competition. In general clubs from countries with the least balanced domestic 
competition, or with the most heavily concentrated distribution of revenue (especially TV 
revenue), exhibit the best Champions League performances and UEFA rankings (Andreff and 
Bourg, 2006). Sloane (2006, page 214) confirmed that: “the more successful clubs in small 
countries may need to be „too strong‟ for domestic competitions to have any hope of being 
successful in European wide competitions”. In respect of FL1, “weak” could be substituted 
                                                          
1
 The relationship between high outcome uncertainty and high income seems to work for the German league.  
2
 More on empirical limitations of the standard relationship between competitive balance and game attendance in 
an open team sports league can be found in Andreff (2009 & 2012). 
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for “small” in this quotation. If high performance in European competition requires a 
sufficiently unbalanced domestic league, one derives the proposition that FL1 has been too 
balanced in the past, in particular until 2008. To some extent, this reasoning may explain the 
French football paradox. 
A reasonable assumption is that the attractiveness of any football game depends on goal 
scoring. The latter is a rather neglected factor in the academic literature, but it was recently 
examined for the major European football leagues in 2003-2007 (Andreff and Raballand, 
2011). French teams scored on average 2.22 goals per game. The corresponding figures were 
2.82 for GBL, 2.59 for ILC, 2.57 for SFL and 2.56 for EPL. A regression of a competitive 
balance measure on various goal scoring measures showed that the former is significantly 
associated with goals scored and conceded, and the numbers of 0-0 draws and 1-0 wins. 
League dummies showed that for a GBL or ILC team to reach the same ranking, it must score 
significantly more goals than a FL1 team; the difference between EPL and FL was not 
significant. Regressing average game attendance on goal scoring reveals that the average 
number of goals scored has a positive impact on attendance, while the percentage of 0-0 
draws has a strong negative effect.  
The importance of goal scoring in attracting spectators is confirmed (Table 3) by regressions 
of average fan attendance per game in the five European major leagues on the average number 
of scored goals per game, using data from 1997 to 2010. The relevant coefficient is positive 
and significant at the 0.01 level. After introducing country dummies, however, the association 
between these two variables vanishes, while the dummies become significant at the 0.01 level. 
This suggests that association between fan attendance and goals scored is country-specific, 
and therefore captured by the dummies. This explanation seems relevant for France, where the 
patterns of football fandom are rather specific, and probably linked to the demographics of 
relatively small urban areas (see below).  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Overall, an excessively balanced domestic competition, together with weak European 
performances achieved by domestic clubs, and too few goals scored, are factors that may be 
relevant in explaining the relatively low levels of spectator interest in FL1. 
A final sporting outcome, sometimes overlooked, refers to the popularity of football not only 
as a spectator sport, but also as a participation sport.  The impact of the professional sport and 
national team performance on participation has not been studied widely in the sports 
economics literature, an exception being Dawson and Downward (2011). There is a paucity of 
comparable data, but the evidence presented by FIFA‟s Big Count for 2000 and 2006 (Table 
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4) suggests that Italian and Spanish football may have benefited from the strong performance 
of ILC and SLF clubs in UEFA competition, and of the national squads in international 
competition, since these two countries record the fastest increase in the percentage of football 
players in their populations. In the case of England, the positive impact of EPL clubs‟ 
performance in the Champions League may have been offset by the moderate performance of 
the national team. The increase in the percentage of registered football players in France is 
probably due more to the achievements of the national squad, rather than the European 
performance of FL1 clubs. The same applies to Germany, although there is little evidence of 
any benefit from the national team‟s success. An alternative hypothesis is that there is no 
significant relationship between top-level football performance and participation. Beyond the 
number of FIFA-registered players, the proportion of non-registered football players may vary 
widely across the five countries. The data do not allow us to test these conjectures.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
With regard to financial results FL1 has experienced a rapid increase in turnover, from €607 
million in 2000 to €1,072 million in 2010, a 77% increase over ten years. Even after such 
growth, FL1 remains the smallest in economic terms among the five major European leagues: 
EPL turnover is more than twice as large, BL and LF about 40% larger, and LC 20% larger. 
French clubs are still economically small compared to clubs in other major football leagues. 
Only two of them regularly appear in the list of the top twenty European clubs in terms of 
revenues estimated by Deloitte every year: Olympique de Marseille (Marseille: 852,396 
inhabitants) and Olympique Lyonnais (Lyon: 472,331 inhabitants). The turnover of several 
leading clubs, such as Real Madrid, Manchester United, FC Barcelona and Chelsea, is 
between two and three times as large. Paris Saint Germain has not appeared in the list so far, 
despite there being 10.4 million Paris inhabitants. One economic weakness of French clubs is 
a small market size translating into lower stadium and TV revenues. Paris, along with 
London, is one of only two European urban areas with more than 8 million inhabitants. 
Among the 44 European urban areas with more than 1 million inhabitants, only three others 
are located in France (Lyon, Marseille, and Lille). Bourg and Gouguet (2010) refer to a 
“French territorial exception”, and there are 36,000 different administrative municipalities 
within the country. The local fan base is often geared towards very small geographical 
locations. In this context it is difficult for clubs to attract a large fan base in cities that are 
mostly relatively small. In many cases attendance is further constrained by stadium capacity.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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LFP assesses itself as the best managed European league, but FL1 has exhibited an overall 
pre-tax deficit every year since 2000, except for four years (Table 5). Although the magnitude 
of FL1 deficits is small compared to IFL and SLC, the record is not exemplary. League debt 
has grown from €427 million in 2000 to €690 million in 2008; since then it has remained 
steady at approximately €600 million (Table 6). With a €610 million debt in 2010, FL1 was 
less indebted than Chelsea alone (€638 million) and much less than the whole of the EPL 
(€2,178 million). For FL1 the greatest concern is the debt structure: payment arrears (on 
transfer fees, tax and social contributions) representing between 85% (in 2000) and 91% 
(2008) of overall debt. This figure was 90% in 2009, 85% in 2010 and 87% in 2011. Ligue 2 
(second division) financial data are a lesser cause for concern in this respect. Payment arrears, 
however, are not indices of good management practices (Andreff, 2007a).  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Let us now turn to the input side of the French football league and clubs. 
 
2. Accounting for stadiums, wage inflation, player transfers and training.  
 
In French Ligue 1 and Ligue 2 most clubs are “professional sporting limited companies” 
(SASP: société anonyme sportive professionnelle). There are three exceptions: Auxerre and 
Bastia are limited companies with a sporting purpose (SAOS: société anonyme à objet 
sportif), and Ajaccio is a personal sporting limited liability company. These three clubs can 
neither pay dividends, nor remunerate their managers. Legislation establishing SASP status 
was passed by the French Parliament in 1999, in order to phase out these limitations (Drut, 
2011). In France, few professional football clubs own their own stadium. Auxerre and Ajaccio 
are exceptions.
3
 Most stadia are rented for around 30 days per year, and cannot be used for a 
commercial purpose alien to football.   
French football stadiums are small in comparison to other European major leagues. In 2008, 
the average capacity in FL1 was 28,673 seats. The corresponding figures were 45,390 in GBL, 
43,000 in ILC, 38,900 in SLF and 38,876 in EPL. No new football stadium has been built 
since 1998, though four were being constructed (Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, and Nice) at the time 
of writing in 2012, and five others were undergoing modernisation and refurbishment (Lens, 
Marseille, Saint-Etienne, Toulouse, and Paris/Parc des Princes) with a  view to hosting the 
2016 European Championships in France. €150 million was allocated to this task, within the 
                                                          
3
 Lens benefits from a very long-term letting lease, while Lyon is in the process of becoming the owner of its 
future newly-built arena (OL land).  
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framework of France‟s economic recovery programme (€36 billion) launched in 2009 in the 
wake of the global financial crisis. A frequent argument is that stadium capacity hinders the 
growth of FL1 income (Bolotny and Debreyer, 2011). This contention cannot be pushed too 
far, however, since average capacity utilization of FL1 stadiums is 76%. This figure is similar 
to the SLF utilization of 74%, but far below the corresponding figures for the EPL (95%) and 
GBL (83%). Italian Calcio, in crisis since 2002, has only a 45% utilization rate. Bolotny and 
Debreyer suggest that in newly-built and modernised stadiums, the focus should be on 
providing a larger number of VIP and business seats at higher ticket prices, with more 
catering facilities (alcohol vendors are prohibited from operating in sport stadiums and arenas 
by the Evin law). Are these strategies likely to succeed? The first depends on the existence of 
a large potential constituency of French football fans among white-collar workers, the rich 
and the gentry, which remains to be demonstrated. The second implies that, as in American 
baseball arenas, spectators are there to crunch popcorn, swallow hamburgers, drink beer and 
only incidentally watch a game. Better French culinary habits suggest this model might not 
transfer easily, however.   
Insert Table 7 about here 
The largest share of football clubs‟ costs is devoted to paying players‟ salaries and associated 
social contributions, in France as in other European countries. The FL1 payroll increased from 
€324 million in 2000 to €777 million in 2011; it has more than doubled within twelve years 
(+140% increase). Wage inflation is greater than the increase in league turnover. With more 
than two-thirds of revenues geared towards payroll payments, FL1, along with ILC and SLF, 
is seriously troubled by wage inflation (Table 7). In 2010 the ratio of payroll costs to total 
revenues was 73%, and in 2011 this ratio increased to 75%.   
In the sports economics literature on football, a significant correlation has been found   
between English clubs‟ payroll costs and their standing in the championship (Szymanski and 
Smith, 1997; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; Hall, Szymanski and Zimbalist, 2002). 
Moreover, using Granger causality tests, wages are a significant determinant of a club‟s 
standing, in line with the theory of efficiency wages. In the same vein, Dobson and Goddard 
(1998) tested causality from lagged gate receipts to current club‟s performance. In the case of 
FL1 and Ligue 2, Llorca and Teste (2012) find reverse Granger causality from sporting 
performance to payroll costs and gate receipts. They conclude that the model of efficiency 
wage is not relevant to the specific conditions of French football. Their interpretation is that 
after a period of success a French football club generates increased revenues, which are 
immediately used to inflate the payroll in order to retain good players and attract new talent. 
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FL1 is typically a net exporter of footballing talent: the sales of highly-talented players 
educated and trained by French clubs are larger in monetary value than expenditure on foreign 
players imported into the league (Table 5). French clubs transfer abroad players valued more 
highly than those they buy from abroad; in other words, FL1 trades its better players for less 
talented players. To some extent, FL1 plays the role of a nursery league for new talent. 
However, from 2001 to 2003, described as “years of folly” (Bolotny, 2006), there was a loss 
of control over the balance of transfers.  The league‟s auditing body – DNCG (Direction 
Nationale de Contrôle de Gestion) – was unable to prevent what has been described as a 
financially reckless recruitment policy conducted by some FL1 clubs. In 2010, a similar 
occurrence increased by €91.7 million the league‟s deficit, which would have been only €22 
million otherwise. The deficit was due to 40 players transferred from abroad at a cost of 
€136.3 million, while 24 players were transferred to foreign leagues generating €60.4 million 
in revenue: an overall deficit of €76.1 million.4  2010 was usual in the sense that FL1 ran a net 
deficit in transfer spending, in contrast to all previous years since 2004. The remaining 
transfer balance deficit (€15.6 million) was due to trade between FL1 and Ligue 2, since the 
second division acts as a nursery for top league clubs.  
The pattern of transfer flows and their orientation is explained partially by the French system 
of educating and training young football players wishing to become professional, which dates 
back to 1972. Since 1990, a regulation compels all professional football clubs to develop a 
vocational educating and training centre for players between the ages of 15 and 19. The player 
is signed on an apprentice, candidate or trainee contract.  The compulsory element is a cause 
for dissatisfaction among some clubs. Transactions involving players below the age of 18 are 
not allowed, in line with FIFA rules. Each young player commits himself to remain in 
education until the end of secondary school, and to sign his first five-year contract with his 
nursery club. However, following the Bosman judgement, this rule has often been 
circumvented, and the outflow of French young players to other major European football 
leagues continues. For instance, in 2007 the average budget of the clubs‟ vocational training 
centres was €3.5 million per year. The corresponding figures were €3 million for EPL clubs, 
€2.8 million for ILC, and €2.4 million for GBL and SLF. Free mobility of players in a global 
labour market since the Bosman case has created a disincentive for rich clubs to invest in 
educating and training their own young players, because they can find players of the same or 
                                                          
4
 Of course transfers of teenage players, below the age of 18, are not encompassed in these official data since 
such transfers are forbidden by the 2001 FIFA rules. There is insufficient space to address the infamous issue of 
a global black market for young players in this chapter. Those interested readers are referred to Andreff (2010) 
where a so-called “Coubertobin tax” is suggested to resolve or at least alleviate the issue.  
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higher quality at lower cost in  minor nursery leagues, or among clubs specialised in 
“producing” good players (Ericson, 2000). The experience of 2010 shows that even a league 
with a solid vocational training system, such as FL1, can be affected by this trend from time 
to time.  
The effect of the Bosman case on the transfer market for French players is exacerbated by the 
present state of the players’ agent profession. In France, this profession is governed by a 
code, which forbids agent remuneration higher than 10% of the transaction and prohibits 
members of certain professions, such as sports club manager, from becoming agents. 
However, a number of non-registered agents circumvent these rules, and operate in a rigged 
market where bungs and embezzlements are common practice according to various official 
reports.
5
 Conflicts of interest among agents, club managers and players fuel such malpractice 
(Brocard, 2010). As a result a study was launched in France in 2005 on reform of the player‟s 
agent profession. A new set of regulations came into force in 2008, opening up the profession 
to foreign agents and attempting to improve the transparency of transactions. A numerus 
clausus, or entry barrier into the profession, was introduced. A player could allow the club to 
remunerate his agent, instead of the agent being paid by the player himself, legalising the 
former common practice, but also creating the potential for conflicts of interest. The position 
of agents was somewhat strengthened by the 2008 changes. However, in 2010, the French 
Parliament prohibited the remuneration of agents by sports clubs, with a view to reducing  
conflicts of interest, and  made the sanctions heavier for breaching the rules (up to two years 
in prison and a €30,000 fine). It is too early to assess the efficiency of this new legislation, 
which is difficult to enforce in a still non-transparent business.  
A non-negligible input to football clubs‟ activity is provided by managers, trainers and 
coaches. In European football in particular, when a club‟s sporting performance is 
disappointing to the fans, the manager or coach is often sacked before the end of season, 
either to create a psychological shock for the team or change the playing tactics, or in the 
hope of hiring a higher-quality replacement. It has been demonstrated that firing the coach 
before the end of season is counter-productive using English (Dobson and Goddard, 2001) 
and Belgian data (De Dios and Forrest, 2007). Similar results have been reported for French 
football (Llorca and Teste, 2010). On average, sporting outcomes improve after a change of 
coach, but econometric testing does not clearly confirm that the improvement can be 
attributed to the new coach. French clubs that fired their coaches during the course of the 
                                                          
5
 Such as the Stevens report in England in 2006.  
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football season obtained poorer results on average than similar (poorly ranked, in bad shape) 
clubs that retained their coaches.  
 
3. Are French professional football clubs efficient? 
 
The contrast between the outcomes of French professional football and the resources it 
mobilises immediately raises questions about the efficiency of French football clubs. Two 
papers tackle the issues of technical efficiency and scale efficiency in French football clubs, 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This methodology does not require any 
assumptions as regards the objective function of the club‟s manager or owner, and measures 
efficiency using a framework that takes into account both sporting and financial inputs and 
outputs. Jardin (2009) finds that, contrary to other estimations for foreign leagues, the 
strongest FL1 teams and the most profitable clubs are not the most efficient units in his 
sample (14 clubs over three seasons, 2004-2007). Club inputs are: total payroll, as a proxy for 
the team‟s stock of talent; and the home city population, as a proxy for market size and 
potential municipal subsidies that can be captured. Club outputs are: the number of points at 
the end of season, as a measure of sporting achievement; and club turnover, as a measure of 
financial performance.  
Regarding the results, pure technical efficiency scores provide information about high/low 
managerial efficiency, while scale efficiency scores show whether the club size is optimal or not. 
A high average score implies that FL1 is efficient: more than one-third of clubs are on the best 
practice frontier with an average score of 0.85 (the maximum is 1) for pure technical and scale 
efficiency. Scale inefficiency is the main source of inefficiency in FL1. On average the clubs‟ 
performance is stable over time, but some decline in efficiency is observed, primarily due to 
the deterioration of the environment that the author interprets as the effect of wage inflation in 
FL1; the latter has exceeded growth in turnover, as noted above. In most cases, French clubs are 
oversized in terms of inputs, since they overinvest in player talents at the start of each football 
season. Therefore, the efficiency of club management may be questioned, and lax 
management seems to reflect weak club governance.  
A more recent paper addresses issues of technical and scale efficiency, again using the DEA 
methodology, for 49 clubs in Ligue 1 and Ligue 2 from 2003 to 2008 (Miningou and 
Vierstraete, 2012). Club inputs are first payrolls, and second all other club expenditures 
(transportation costs, commodity purchases, and so on). Two other inputs are included to 
control for the quality of the club‟s environment: a divisional dummy (Ligue 1 or Ligue 2) and 
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a dummy for participation in UEFA competitions. Outputs are the number of points at the end 
of season and game attendance.  
The average efficiency score is only 0.625, suggesting that French clubs could have obtained 
the same output level with 37.5% less input. Among the least efficient, Paris Saint Germain 
could have saved 80% of its inputs and achieved a similar outcome by operating at maximum 
efficiency. Average efficiency is higher in Ligue 2 (0.849) and among those clubs that did not 
participate in UEFA competitions. However, in both leagues, average efficiency decreases 
over time, due to player salary inflation. Finally, sporting performance (the club‟s ranking) 
and efficiency are not correlated; neither are game attendance and efficiency. The authors 
again raise the issue of lax management. 
 
4. The sources of French football finance: from TV-dependence to sugar daddies 
 
Three pillars are alleged to be specific to French professional football: its aforementioned 
system of player vocational training, a strong ethos of solidarity within the league, and its 
financial control and auditing (Gouguet and Primault, 2006). Another pillar is common to all 
European football: a financial model that is increasingly reliant on TV revenue.  
Solidarity is no longer based on sharing gate receipts between the hosts and visiting clubs, 
which was phased out in the early 1980s. Since then a revenue redistribution scheme relies on 
the collective sale of TV broadcasting rights by the league, which collects the TV revenues 
through contracts signed with the TV companies at four-year intervals. Originally, the 
redistribution scheme was egalitarian, with equal shares of TV revenues being allocated to 
each FL1 club. Since 2000, the criteria for revenue distribution have become increasingly 
complex and non-egalitarian. One portion is fixed and equal for all clubs. A second portion 
depends upon the clubs‟ rankings at the end of each season. A third portion is indexed to the 
club‟s performance over the past five seasons. A final portion is calculated according to the 
club‟s attractiveness, measured by its TV audience - this criterion was introduced in response 
to pressure from the clubs with the most TV exposure. Table 8 shows that the league 
champions in 2010 received three times more TV revenue than one of the lowest-ranked non-
relegated clubs (Sochaux) and roughly four times more than the three relegated clubs. Ligue 2 
clubs also receive a (small) share of the TV revenue windfall, although their games were not 
broadcast at all until recently. Legislation passed in 2000 requires the redistribution of a 5% 
tax on professional football TV revenues to non-professional sports, through the National 
Council for Sport Development (CNDS: Conseil National de Développement du Sport).  
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Insert Table 8 about here 
The main debate surrounding the distribution of TV revenues is no longer the question of 
league competitive balance. The distribution depends on pressure and the relative bargaining 
power of a small number of rich clubs that are the subject of most of the TV coverage, and the 
majority of smaller clubs. For the formula for the distribution of the TV revenue reflects a 
minimal commitment to the principle of solidarity between all professional football clubs on 
the one hand and, on the other hand, is enforced by law to maintain solidarity between 
professional football and other less endowed sports that do not benefit from similar TV 
exposure. Since 2000, however, the solidarity principle has been counteracted by the TV 
windfall obtained from the UEFA Champions League, which is concentrated on the few clubs 
qualified to enter this competition. However, this driver towards increasing revenue inequality 
across the clubs is milder in FL1 than in other major European leagues, because of the French 
clubs‟ relatively poor performance in the Champions League.   
As early as 1974 the supervision of professional football clubs‟ management has been 
entrusted to a body which became the DNCG in 1990. Since then, DNCG acted as a real 
auditing body, capable of implementing disciplinary sanctions against poorly managed clubs. 
Every season, the DNCG inspects the financial accounts of all clubs, and since 2002 some of 
the data have been published, even though initially some clubs in debt attempted to 
circumvent the requirement to publish their financial data (Andreff, 2007b). The DNCG‟s 
main official tasks are to audit clubs‟ financial accounts, supervise their bookkeeping, detect 
instances of misreporting, and assess the clubs‟ financial situation.  
When a club is continually in the red, the DNCG can use carrot-and-stick tactics to encourage 
changes of management practice, so that the club‟s accounts return to the black. The process 
begins with warnings, advice and recommendations with regard to urgent policy measures to 
be taken by the clubs‟ management. If the financial deficit does not disappear, sanctions can 
be applied: the DNCG is allowed to audit the payroll in detail, to prohibit the recruitment of 
new players for a certain period, to impose fines and, as a last resort, to relegate the club to a 
lower division. Several clubs have been relegated since 1990 under this provision, namely 
Angoulême, Bordeaux, Brest, Grenoble, Marseille, Nice and Toulouse. The objective is to 
ensure the financial viability of the French championship in the sense that any club which 
starts the competition must be able to complete its fixture list over the entire season. In other 
words, the DNCG guarantees that each club will have sufficient financial resources 
throughout the season. The auditing body has prevented French clubs from sinking as deeply 
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into indebtedness as some big Italian and Spanish clubs, or top English clubs such as Chelsea, 
Manchester United and Arsenal. 
To a foreign observer, it may seem strange that on the one hand French football has a strong 
auditing body, while on the other hand FL1 repeatedly reports financial deficits. This paradox 
can be explained by a soft budget constraint (5 infra) linked to weak club governance. 
Questions have also been raised as to whether DNCG is an independent auditor. All of its 
members are appointed from football backgrounds such as FFF, LFP and players‟, coaches‟ 
and managers‟ trade unions. A useful reform would be the appointment of at least 50% of the 
experts who sit on the DNCG from non-football backgrounds.  
The model of French professional football finance has much in common with other major 
European leagues. Since the mid-1990s the bigger clubs have largely abandoned their former 
financial structure, primarily based on Spectators (gate receipts), Sponsors and Subsidies from 
Local sources – the SSSL model as described in Andreff and Staudohar (2000) – and switched 
to a MCMMG model of finance based on new Global sources of revenue, such as Media (TV  
revenue), Corporations, Merchandising and Markets. FL1 is so typical of MCMMG (Table 9) 
that its financial structure has been described as TV-dependent or even “TV-addicted”. The 
share of TV revenue in total revenue reached 58% in 2011 and 2012, almost as high as in 
Italian Calcio (over 60% since 2006).  
Insert Table 9 about here 
With regard to merchandising and stadium naming rights, French clubs derive a smaller share 
of their revenue from these sources than some European clubs, such as Manchester United 
(merchandising) or Arsenal (naming rights). Le Mans signed a naming rights contract with an 
insurance company some years ago, but it was later relegated to the second division.  
The markets that are used for club financing are the labour market for talents by football 
nursery clubs (2 supra), and capital markets in the form of initial public offerings (IPOs) prior 
to stock market floatation. In 2012 Malcolm Glazer sold 10% of Manchester United stocks on 
the New York Stock Exchange, raising $233 million. In some sense, he is swimming against 
the tide, since the number of listed European football  clubs which had reached 44 in the early 
2000s, was down to 21 in 2012. The stock market valuation of many listed clubs had fallen, 
for several reasons: illiquidity of the DJ StoXX Football market, share price volatility, the 
impact of (poor) sporting performance on a club‟s stock price, uncertainty attached to the 
fundamental value of football clubs heavily dependent on intangible assets (the non-amortised 
value of players‟ contracts), and finally the low profitability of such investments (Aglietta et 
al., 2008). French legislation passed in October 2006, allowing sport club shares to be 
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publicly offered and floated, has linked IPOs to the acquisition of tangible assets likely to 
reinforce the club‟s stability and durability. Olympique Lyonnais backed its IPO in 2007 with 
a project of OL land – a sporting and commercial centre including a 60,000 seat stadium – 
while FC Istres (2
nd
 division) linked an IPO to the construction of a hotel and a re-education 
centre for high level sportsmen and women. Since flotation Olympique Lyonnais shares have 
lost more than 80% of the IPO value, and  FC Istres shares have lost more than 60%. Overall, 
French football‟s experience of using stock market flotation to raise capital has not been 
encouraging.  
French clubs whose ownership is in the hands of a corporation or a wealthy individual are 
fewer in number than in EPL and ILC, but have included RC Paris (Matra), RC Strasbourg 
(McCormack‟s IMG) and more recently Rennes (François Pinault), Grenoble (Index 
Corporation, Japan) and Nantes (Waldemar Kita). Until recently, no French club had attracted 
big foreign “sugar daddy” investment, as is common in EPL6. However, there have been signs 
of an emerging trend. In June 2011, Qatar Sports Investment purchased 70% of Paris Saint 
Germain stock and spent €85 million on the mercato for acquiring star players. The club 
finished second in the 2011-12 championship. Further recruitment of star players (Zlatan 
Ibrahimovic and Thiago Silva) has taken place subsequently. In December 2011, Dmitri 
Rybolovlev, a Russian oligarch (owner of the potash company Uralkali) bought the newly 
relegated AS Monaco, and provided investment aimed at securing swift promotion. Unlike 
EPL, at the time of writing French football had not attracted any large-scale American 
investment. 
Sugar daddies sometimes bail out a club in the red, which otherwise should have entered 
administration (in EPL) or been relegated because of a financial deficit (LFP). Paris Saint 
Germain was a case in point, with a poor financial position and rather weak sporting 
performance. The new UEFA Financial Fair Play regulation limits losses to €45 million over 
three years, with external investment permitted to cover current deficits in 2013-14 and 2014-
15, with the allowance reducing to €30 million by 2017-18. These regulations will impose 
restrictions on the extent of possible bail-outs, but will still permit a club to be subsidised by a 
sugar daddy in a limited way. No doubt, some French clubs may continue to seek foreign 
investment. However, repeated, even limited, deficits, debts and bail-outs mean that French 
(and European) football clubs operate with a soft budget constraint.  
                                                          
6
 Al-Fayed in Fulham, Abramovich in Chelsea, Glazer in Manchester United, Gaydamak in Portsmouth, Lerner 
in Aston Villa, Gudmundsson in West Ham, Hicks and Gillett then NESW in Liverpool, Sheikh Mansour in 
Manchester City, Usmanov in Arsenal, Mittal then Ecclestone in QPR.  
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5. Soft budget constraint, TV rights revenues and the financial crisis 
 
Since European football is now essentially deregulated, and in general football clubs do not 
aim for profit-maximisation, an increasing number of professional clubs run heavy deficits, 
season after season, and have sunk into deep indebtedness. However, bankruptcy is a rare 
event, since many clubs have been bailed out, by the banks in Spain (Ascari and Gagnepain, 
2006), occasionally by the state (in Italy, the salve calcio state plan in 2002, Baroncelli and 
Lago, 2006), or increasingly by sugar daddy investors. TV companies have regularly helped 
cover ex post the leagues‟ deficits by increasing the sums paid for TV rights (Andreff, 2009). 
In general clubs in the red throughout Europe have not been liquidated, despite heavy arrears 
on debt repayments, social contributions and tax. Football clubs have spent seemingly without 
constraint, purchased more inputs than they could afford given their revenues, and have 
attempted endlessly to recruit expensive superstar players. In this context, economic theory 
suggests that the firms (clubs) are subject to a soft budget constraint. This situation is typical 
of a shortage (Kornaï, 1980) or repressed inflation (Benassy, 1982) economy, similar to the 
former centrally-planned economies, which can also emerge in particular industries in market 
economies (Kornaï et al., 2003). A case in point is a sports league with clubs that do not 
maximise profit. Storm and Nielsen (2012) cite evidence supporting the existence of a soft 
budget constraint in professional football, and stress that European professional football clubs 
continually operate on the brink of insolvency without going out of business. The survival rate 
is high,
7
 even though the football business perpetually generates losses. Tables 5 and 6 have 
documented that French football is no exception in this respect. Since the very existence of 
payment arrears is a well-known index of poor corporate governance, one interpretation of 
such a situation is in terms of weak club and league governance (Andreff, 2007a, b; Andreff, 
2012). It suggests that a disequilibrium model may be more useful in describing an open 
sports league (Andreff, 2014) than the usual equilibrium model elaborated on by Késenne 
(2007).  
In respect of FL1, like most European football leagues, there is a close association between 
the rise in TV revenue and payroll inflation. An optimistic interpretation suggests a virtuous 
circle: TV revenues enable teams to pay high salaries in order to field highly performing 
squads, whose frequent wins accrue increased TV revenues (Baroncelli and Lago, 2006). 
                                                          
7
 Such a high survival rate is demonstrated in English football by Kuper and Szymanski (2009).  
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Italian Calcio, which is the authors‟ reference, is in the deepest financial crisis and seems 
difficult to reconcile with the notion of a virtuous circle. Under a vicious circle interpretation, 
the league, as a monopoly supplier in its own market, bargains for the highest possible TV 
rights in order to raise ex post the finance that will cover rampant payroll inflation and the 
escalating costs of superstar recruitment. If this strategy is successful, it will sustain league 
finances and to some extent bail out football clubs that are in the red. However, in many 
football leagues, like FL1, the recruitment strategy financed by TV revenue does not translate 
into sufficient team improvement to produce success in European competition, as required to 
achieve substantial gains in revenue. With the clubs unable to recoup their recruitment 
expenditures, the league has to revert to the broadcasters in an effort to negotiate an even 
higher price for the TV rights, and so on. The direction of causality in the relationship 
between TV revenues and payroll can be tested, in order to validate the vicious circle 
assumption. Our test is confined to the two French professional football leagues. The sample 
encompasses 213 observations from seasons 2002-03 to 2007-08. Under the vicious circle 
interpretation, TV revenues are the endogenous variable, explained by the following 
exogenous instrumental variables:  
POP 2005, 2005 population of the city where the team is located;  
NOT represents the media attractiveness of each team, using its ranking by LFP according to 
audience performance;  
DIST is a proxy for the distance that TV channels have to cover in order to reach the stadium 
of each team. DIST is measured using team transportation costs (available from team 
budgets), which is a suitable proxy, since it measures the costs incurred for a team to travel to 
all other stadiums in the league (similar to the costs imposed a TV channel that travels to all 
stadiums for broadcasting purposes). We test the relationship:  
TV  =  k  +  a.POP2005  +  b.DIST  +  c.NOT  +  d.LEAGUE +  e.Year2 +  f.Year3 +  
g.Year4  +  h.Year5  +  i.Year 6  + zi  (1) 
Equation (1) includes a league dummy variable (LEAGUE = 1 if Ligue 2 and LEAGUE = 0 if 
Ligue 1), and a dummy variable to test whether the relationship is sensitive to the observation 
year (2003 being the reference year). We then examine the relationship between payroll 
(salaries and compulsory social contributions) and the endogenous regressor TV. Staiger and 
Stock (1997) have demonstrated that, when instrumental variables are weak, conventional 
asymptotic results do not hold with large samples. If the F-statistic is smaller than 10 with a 
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single endogenous regressor, there is a potential issue of a weak instrumental variable. To be 
relevant, our test must exhibit F > 10, which is the case.  
Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here 
The relationship between the TV variable and instrumental variables is significant in all four 
specifications of model (1). Playing in a higher division is also significant. The observation 
year is not significant, except in 2007 and 2008 when tough bargaining on the part of the TV 
companies resulted in an agreement, reached in February 2008, in which the value of the TV 
rights was almost unchanged. The relationship between payroll and TV revenues is significant 
in all specifications, and the hypothesis of a vicious circle in which TV revenues determine 
salaries is supported. Even though UEFA Financial Fair Play sends a signal in the right 
direction of hardening the clubs‟ budget constraints, it might not be sufficiently onerous to 
dismantle this vicious circle. A hard budget constraint would preclude the clubs from running 
any deficits, and strict enforcement would be required. The extent to which UEFA Financial 
Fair Play is enforced remains to be seen.  
Since the 2008-09 season FL1, in common with most other European football leagues, has 
been affected by the impact of the global financial and economic crisis: attendance has 
decreased slightly (Figure 1), and the league‟s revenues have stagnated (Table 5). This has 
translated into harsher times, with 20 clubs exhibiting pre-tax deficits in the two divisions in 
2011
8
. Six clubs have moved beyond the €5 million UEFA annual deficit allowance, and will 
have to adjust in 2013. Against this bleak background, the good news is the recently increased 
attractiveness of French professional football to international media, which has materialised 
through the creation of BeIn1 and BeIn2 channels by the Qatari company Al-Jazeera. Be-In 
has invested €150 million for live broadcasts of 8 out of 10 televised games during the week. 
This cash injection adds to the €420 million spent by Canal+ to broadcast two games each 
weekend on prime time TV. Renewed competition between two TV channels put an end to 
four years of slowdown in the growth of football TV revenues, owing to the monopoly 
position of Canal+ in the market. This represents good news for the future of French football 
finance.  
 
6. Conclusion: Which future for French professional football?  
 
                                                          
8
 In million €: Bordeaux (-6.5), Caen (-1.6), Lens (-5.9), Lille (-8.7), Lyon (-35.1), Marseille (-14.7), Monaco (-
0.3), Nice (-1.2), Paris Saint Germain (-0.2 after bail out), Valenciennes (-3.7); and in Ligue 2 : Ajaccio (-2.6), 
Angers (-0.7), Châteauroux (-0.2), Evian TG (-0.6), Istres (-0.4), Le Havre (-1.5), Le Mans (-2.9), Metz (-5.5), 
Sedan (-0.2), Troyes (-1.6). 
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FL1 is neither much different from other major European football leagues, nor an exception as 
regards its management and governance. In common with other leagues, a soft budget 
constraint triggers wage inflation and heavy dependence on TV revenue. No major French 
club has gone bankrupt, although many have been in the red. This feature, however, is not 
French-specific but industry-specific, since the picture is similar in other major European 
football leagues. In some respects French football shows signs of convergence with the latter, 
especially regarding the opening up of French football to international investors, to a foreign 
broadcaster, to Russian and Qatari sugar daddies, and to global football on-line betting. 
Eventually, French football will have to align with the new UEFA Financial Fair Play rules. 
This will be a step forward, as in many other European countries, on the path to better 
governance and management. Nevertheless, the imposition of a hard budget constraint of a 
kind that is characteristic of shareholder-controlled profit-maximising firms in many other 
sectors, is a distant prospect. The last published 2011 LFP report, following the October 2010 
“football States General” triggered by the poor behaviour of the national squad at the 2010 
World Cup, calls for governance reform and the creation of a Football High Authority, but 
does not  go as far as recommending the imposition of a hard budget constraint. An urgent 
priority is the tightening the enforcement of on-line betting regulation, and the supervision of 
bets by a state regulator (ARJEL: Autorité de Régulation des Jeux en Ligne). This was 
introduced in June 2011, to address concerns that sporting integrity may have been 
undermined by rigged bets staked by international networks into fixed matches.  
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Table 1: Performance of European major leagues in UEFA competitions, 2000-2012 
      
Champions League English EPL French FL1 German BL Italian LC Spanish LF 
Number of winners from 2 0 1 3 5 
Number of 1/4 finalists 30 7 11 17 25 
Europa League English EPL French FL1 German BL Italian LC Spanish LF 
Number of winners from 1 0 0 0 5 
Number of 1/4 finalists 11 6 14 7 22 
Total English EPL French FL1 German BL Italian LC Spanish LF 
Number of winners from 3 0 1 3 10 
Number of 1/4 finalists 41 13 25 24 47 
Source: UEFA (2000 is for the 1999-2000 season, and so on).   
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Table 2: Competitive balance in five European major football leagues 
  (1997-2012)    
A/ Noll-Scully index     
Season French L1 English EPL Italian LC Spanish LF German BL 
1996/97 1,47 1,23 1,33 1,61 1,43 
1997/98 1,31 1,28 1,76 1,39 1,14 
1998/99 1,42 1,52 1,35 1,41 1,52 
1999/2000 0,88 1,69 1,65 1,03 1,43 
2000/01 1,15 1,43 1.60 1,29 1,14 
2001/02 1,18 1,72 1,71 1,14 1,54 
2002/03 1,28 1,62 1,56 1,32 1,23 
2003/04 1,46 1,57 1,86 1,28 1,61 
2004/05 1.10 1,73 1,45 1,51 1.50 
2005/06 1,44 1,94 1,97 1,49 1,53 
2006/07 1,06 1,64 1,78 1,39 1.30 
2007/08 1,36 2,09 1.60 1,46 1,47 
Mean 96/08 1.26 1.62 1.64 1.36 1.40 
2008/09 1.58 1.91 1.59 1.50 1.59 
2009/10 1.60 1.87 1.56 1.84 1.53 
2010/11 1.25 1.33 1.52 1.71 1.38 
2011/12 1.48 1.78 1.56 1.70 1.60 
Mean 08/12 1,48 1,72 1,56 1,69 1.53 
Mean 96/12 1.32 1.65 1.62 1.44 1.58 
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B/ Spearman rank correlation between season t and season t-1 rankings  
Season t French L1 English EPL Italian LC Spanish LF German BL 
1996/97 0.50 0,63 n.d.  0,55 0,34 
1997/98 0,46 0,43 0,65 0,61 0,39 
1998/99 0,49 0,71 0,53 0,71 0,37 
1999/2000 0,24 0,83 0,81 0,59 0.70 
2000/01 0.00 0,88 0,85 0,65 0,25 
2001/02 0,08 0,61 0,75 0,61 0,69 
2002/03 0,28 0,63 0,62 0,55 0,53 
2003/04 0.60 0,43 0,81 0,45 0,44 
2004/05 0,68 0,45 0,64 0,59 0,61 
2005/06 0,67 0,66 0,43 0,48 0,75 
2006/07 0,48 0,66 0,52 0,58 0,72 
2007/08 0.20 0,66 0,65 0,59 0,49 
2008/09 0.23 0.70 0.80 0.87 0.65 
2009/10 0.71 0.75 0.59 0.63 0.34 
2010/11 0.33 0.87 0.46 0.60 0.09 
2011/12 0.48 0.86 0.75 0.40 0.09 
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Table 3: Regression of average fan attendance on the average number of goals scored  
  1997-2010     
       
    Model 1     Model 2   
Independent variables Coefficient 
Standard 
error P>|t|      Coefficient 
Standard 
error P>|t|      
Average number of goals /game 18.918 3.236 0.000*** -1.460 3.260 0.656 
GER dummy    16.434 1.998 0.000*** 
SPA dummy    4.960 1.580 0.003*** 
ENG dummy    13.343 1.470 0.000*** 
ITA dummy    6.298 1.509 0.000*** 
Constant -21.263 8.457 0.014** 23.640 7.611 0.003*** 
*** significant at a 1% threshold; ** at a 5% threshold.      
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Table 4: The percentage of registered* football players in the 
population 
      
Year England France Germany Italy Spain 
2000 5.4 4.7 7.6 7.0 6.1 
2006 6.9 5.2 7.7 8.6 7.0 
* Registered in their national federation.     
Source: FIFA Big Count.     
 
 
Table 5: Turnover, pre-tax cash balance and transfer fee balance in French 
professional football 
 
(million  
 
€) 
   
             
  1999-
00 
2000-
01 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
2003-
04 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
2006-07 2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
Turnover               
Ligue 1 607 608 643 689 655 697 910 972 989 1,048 1,072 1,041 
Ligue 2 120 124 134 135 137 165 186 206 222 229 200 202 
Total 727 732 777 824 792 862 1,096 1,178 1,211 1,277 1,272 1,243 
Cash balance              
Ligue 1 2.2 -53.6 -46.3 -151.2 -35.9 -32.5 27.7 42,7 25.0 -14,7 -114,1 -46.1 
Ligue 2 1.4 -14.2 -20.2 -15.8 -8.0 5.5 5.0 4,1 1,8 -18,9 -15,9 -18.9 
Total 3.6 -67.8 -66.5 -167.0 -43.9 -27.0 32.7 46,8 26,8 -33,6 -130.0 -65.0 
Transfer fee balance              
Ligue 1 8.1 -19.3 -68.1 -100.2 17.9 3.0 14.7 31.7 58.8 41.9 -91.7 73.4 
Ligue 2 19.5 26.0 21.0 10.3 15.5 12.2 11.8 20.1 21.1 37.3 16.5 18.5 
Total 27.6 6.7 -47.1 -89.9 33.4 15.2 26.5 51.8 79.9 79.2 -75.2 91.9 
Source: 
LFP/DNCG. 
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Table 6 : Ligue 1 balance sheet (million €)          
             
Ligue 1 
1999-
00 
2000-
01 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
2003-
04 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
Intangible fixed assets* 341.2 434.7 346.5 249.8 167.1 194.3 262.9 266.6 346.1 339.2 356.5 273.8 
Other fixed assets 41.6 45.3 60.2 75.2 75.8 90.2 102.4 95.2 116.0 103.7 112.2 114.8 
Circulating assets 295.9 332.2 329.0 237.8 265.6 274.3 266.1 339.1 369.4 355.3 348.2 363.0 
Liquidities 124.5 117.1 111.5 157.7 92.5 108.9 187.9 191.9 168.2 149.5 112.4 173.5 
Total Assets 803.2 929.3 847.2 720.5 601.0 668.7 819.3 892.8 999.7 947.7 929.3 925.1 
Own capital 89.3 84.0 142.8 93.2 139.4 111.7 159.6 208.6 213.4 265.6 189.0 183.7 
Stockholders accounts 163.5 223.1 141.7 119.9 60.1 53.1 75.2 51.2 61.8 56.6 104.9 100.9 
Provisions, risks 123.0 101.0 59.6 49.9 37.3 37.5 52.5 54.0 34.6 32.7 25.4 29.0 
Financial debts 64.5 96.3 86.1 112.7 66.1 63.0 70.4 71.3 62.4 60.2 94.2 87.2 
Other debts ** 362.9 424.9 416.9 344.8 298.1 403.4 461.6 507.7 627.6 532.6 515.7 524.3 
Total Liabilities 803.2 929.3 847.2 720.5 601.0 668.7 819.3 892.8 999.7 947.7 929.3 925.1 
* Players transfer fees not yet amortised.            
** Payment arrears, tax and social contribution arrears.         
Source: LFP/DNCG             
 
28 
 
 
Table 7: Ratio between gross payroll* and European football clubs total revenues   
    (in %)        
           
League 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
German BL 56 54 53 50 55 47 51 45 50 51 
English 
EPL 
62 60 62 61 61 59 62 63 62 67 
Spanish LF 54 73 72 72 64 64 64 62 63 63 
Italian LC 62 75 90 76 73 62 58 62 68 73 
French FL1  53 64 69 68 69 63 59 64 71 69 
* Salaries and associated social contributions.       
Source: Deloitte         
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Table 8: Redistribution of TV rights revenues across Ligue 1 clubs, 2009-2010  
    (millions euros)   
       
Season Club Fixed  Portion based  Portion based on Portion based on Total 
rank   portion on season rank past 5 seasons ranks audience/notoriety   
1 Marseille 12.4 17.9 3.1 17.4 50.8 
2 Lyon 12.4 15.6 3.6 15.0 46.6 
3 Auxerre 12.4 13.5 1.6 2.8 30.4 
4 Lille 12.4 11.8 2.3 7.6 34.1 
5 Montpellier 12.4 10.2 0.2 1.2 24.1 
6 Bordeaux 12.4 8.9 2.7 10.2 34.2 
7 Lorient 12.4 7.7 0.4 1.0 21.6 
8 Monaco 12.4 6.7 1.6 3.7 24.5 
9 Rennes 12.4 5.8 2.0 5.7 26.0 
10 Valenciennes 12.4 5.1 0.3 1.3 19.2 
11 Lens 12.4 4.4 0.8 6.5 24.1 
12 Nancy 12.4 3.8 0.5 2.4 19.2 
13 Paris St Germain 12.4 3.3 0.9 12.9 29.5 
14 Toulouse 12.4 2.9 1.0 3.2 19.6 
15 Nice 12.4 2.5 1.0 1.8 17.8 
16 Sochaux 12.4 2.2 0.6 2.1 17.3 
17 Saint-Etienne 12.4 1.9 1.3 8.8 24.4 
18 Le Mans 12.4 0 0.5 1.5 14.4 
19 Boulogne 12.4 0 0.2 0.7 13.3 
20 Grenoble 12.4 0 0.3 0.9 13.6 
 Source: LFP.      
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Table 9: The structure of French Ligue 1 finance, 1996-2012   
       
Season Gate receipts Subsidies Sponsors TV revenues Others* Total 
1995-96 24 17 22 31 6 100 
1996-97 22 15 26 32 5 100 
1997-98 21 12 20 42 5 100 
1998-99 22 10 20 42 6 100 
1999-00 17 4 16 56 7 100 
2000-01 16 4 18 51 11 100 
2001-02 15 3 20 52 10 100 
2002-03 15 4 20 52 9 100 
2003-04 18 4 22 47 9 100 
2004-05 19 3 20 49 9 100 
2005-06 15 3 18 57 7 100 
2006-07 22 2 16 53 7 100 
2007-08 14 2 20 56 8 100 
2008-09 14 2 18 55 11 100 
2009-10 13 2 16 57 12 100 
2010-11 13 2 17 58 10 100 
2011-12 13 2 18 58 9 100 
* Includes Merchandising      
Source: DNCG.       
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Table 10: OLS regression of TV rights revenues on instrumental variables   
         
TV rights revenues                (I)                 (II)                (III)                (IV)   
  Coefficient P > |t| Coefficient P > |t| Coefficient P > |t| Coefficient P > |t| 
POP 2005 0.003 0.03** 0.002 0.06* 0.003 0.03** 0.002 0.05** 
DIST 9.73 0.00*** 7.11 0.00*** 9.34 0.00*** 6.30 0.00*** 
NOT -26.53 0.71 -138.45 0.03** -73.29 0.31 -217.86 0.00*** 
LEAGUE   -7137.80 0.00***    -7816.28 0.00*** 
Year 2003-04      -1067.83 0.44 -703.34 0.54 
Year 2004-05      -422.42 0.75 -118.31 0.92 
Year 2005-06      2009.61 0.14 2832.70 0.01*** 
Year 2006-07      2527.31 0.07* 3751.95 0.00*** 
Year 2007-08      1684.71 0.23 3139.85 0.01*** 
Constant -1323.90 0.23 7243.41 0.00*** -1235.42 0.35 7855.52 0.00*** 
R2                 0.76                 0.82                 0.77                 0.84 
F-stat               220.26               236.64                87.41               122.29 
*** Significant at a 1% threshold; ** at a 5% threshold; * at a 10% threshold.    
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Table 11: OLS regression of payroll on predicted TV rights revenues    
         
Payroll                (I)               (II)              (III)              (IV) 
  Coefficient P > |t| Coefficient P > |t| Coefficient P > |t| Coefficient P > |t| 
Predicted TV 1.047 0.00*** 1.101 0.00*** 1.086 0.00*** 1.175 0.00*** 
LEAGUE    1419.37 0.22    2415.21 0.04** 
Year 2003-04       709.14 0.62 773.27 0.53 
Year 2004-05       695.07 0.61 793.43 0.51 
Year 2005-06       -1455.02 0.30 -1728.96 0.16 
Year 2006-07       -4539.37 0.00*** -4934.97 0.00*** 
Year 2007-08       -2827.49 0.05** -3220.82 0.01*** 
Constant 848.51 0.15 -566.08 0.66 1729.91 0.11 -470.50 0.75 
R2                 0.77                 0.82                 0.78                 0.83 
F-stat               692.88               484.64               118.90               144.09 
*** Significant at a 1% threshold; ** at a 5% threshold; * at a 10% threshold.    
 
 
 
 
